nonetheless maintains that relations constitute a distinct category of being. That is to say, relations are not just monadic properties, according to Albert, they are a sui generis type of monadic property. In the course of examining his theory, I intend to make clear not only how Albert can consistently maintain such a position, but also the reasons why he (or anyone like him) might be inclined to do so. In the process, moreover, I uncover an interesting dialectical position whose merits have been entirely overlooked in contemporary discussions of relations.
In addition to being philosophically interesting, Albert's discussion of relations is also historically important, shedding light on the development of medieval theories of relations generally. Because of its systematic nature, Albert's discussion illuminates the main types of theory one can adopt with respect to the nature and ontological status of relations, and enables us to identify the sorts of considerations that led particular medieval philosophers to prefer one type of theory over another. Moreover, because Albert's discussion contains an extensive treatment of anti-realism about relations, it sheds some light on a position which, though certainly a minority view in the Latin West, appears to have had a significant following in the Arabic-speaking world.
Albert discusses relations in a number of different contexts, many of which are theological in nature. In what follows, I focus only on those contexts in which Albert develops (as opposed to refines or extends) the general type of theory to which he is committed. 3 The most important texts in this regard are Albert's philosophical commentaries on Aristotle's Categories and Metaphysics. 4 Although both of these works follow the subject matter and arrangement of Aristotle's texts, neither is a commentary or paraphrase in the strict sense. Indeed, as we shall see, in each case these Aristotelian texts provide Albert with an occasion to develop his own (broadly Aristotelian) views.
BACKGROUND
Aristotle's Categories introduced medieval philosophers to an exhaustive division of "things said without combination". 5 Although Aristotle divides these things into ten categories or classes, he discusses only the first four in any detail-namely, substance, quantity, quality, and relation.
In Categories 7 Aristotle singles out the category of relation for independent consideration. He assumes that its members are a certain type of accident, and hence that the nature of relations must be explained, at least in part, by their inhering in particular substances. This assumption may help to explain why, unlike contemporary philosophers, who habitually speak of relations as holding between two or more individuals, Aristotle prefers to say that relations inhere in one thing and somehow point toward (pros) another. Indeed, Aristotle's preferred name for this category just is toward something (pros ti).
By Albert's time it was customary for medieval philosophers to refer to the category of relations using not only Aristotle's term, "toward something" (or ad aliquid, the verbatim Latin equivalent of pros ti), but also the terms "relative" (relativum) and "relation" (relatio). Medieval philosophers often move freely among these terms without paying much attention to their various senses. 6 Although Albert himself often follows this common medieval practice, we shall eventually see that there comes a point in each of his commentaries when he wants to maintain, not only that these terms differ in sense, but that their different senses are important for understanding the nature of relations.
Let us turn now to Albert's characterization of relations. Following medieval logical tradition, Albert refers to the first three Aristotelian categories-namely, substance, quantity, and quality-as absolute categories (absoluta), and attempts to distinguish relations from the members of these absolute categories by appealing to 4 broadly logical considerations. A relation, he says, is what is signified by a certain type of predicate, one which he and other medieval philosophers call a "relative term" (ad aliquid or relativum).
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Roughly speaking, a relative term is a predicate whose true predication requires a comparison of the subject of predication to something else. For obvious reasons, Albert gives "taller" (maius) as a paradigm example of this sort of term.
For when we assert of an individual, say Simmias, that he is taller-that is, when we predicate the term "taller" of him-we necessarily do so in comparison to something else.
We don't merely say that Simmias is taller; we say that he is taller than Socrates, or Theatetus, or the average man. If we borrow on Albert's behalf the notation of first-order logic, we can make his characterization more precise by saying that a term F is relative just in case a statement of the form "Fx" is more perspicuously represented by a statement of the form "Fxy". (We can say that a term F is absolute, by contrast, just in case it is not relative.) 8 According to Albert, therefore, relations are the entities signified by relative terms (such as "taller")-that is to say, they are the significata of what we would nowadays call relational predicates. 9 It is important to notice that this characterization of As it turns out, Albert thinks there are only two views that one can take with regard to the nature and ontological status of relations. One can either be a realist, and say that the significata of at least some of our relational predicates are (non-linguistic) entities existing in extramental reality, or one can be a conceptualist, and say that they are entities existing only in the mind. Now initially it might seem odd that Albert thinks of 5 these as the only two alternatives. After all, couldn't there be a form of anti-realism other than conceptualism-say, nominalism, where this is understood either as the view that relational predicates are not significant, or else as the view that their significata are mere words or linguistic expressions (nomina)? The correct answer for Albert, I think, is "no".
Albert assumes that relational predicates are meaningful, and on his semantic theory, words are meaningful in virtue of signifying, or being subordinated to, particular concepts. 10 But this already insures that relations exist at least in the mind (as concepts).
For if relational predicates are meaningful, and meaningful predicates signify concepts, then relational predicates signify concepts. But these concepts must themselves be relations, since as we have seen, Albert thinks relations just are the significata of relational predicates. Initially, therefore, the important question for Albert is not whether relations exist, but whether they exist only in the mind. And in order to answer this question he thinks we must decide whether anything in extramental reality corresponds to any of our relational concepts. For according to him, meaningful terms signify not only concepts, but whatever (if anything) is represented by these concepts in extramental reality.
In order to bring out what is important in Albert's conception of the debate between realists and conceptualists, we may characterize their opposing views as follows:
Realism is the view that there is something in extramental reality corresponding to at least some of our relational concepts.
Conceptualism is the view that there isn't anything in extramental reality corresponding to any of our relational concepts. Keeping in mind that these are, as Albert sees it, the only genuine alternatives one can take with respect to the nature and ontological status of relations, let us turn to his own view.
REALISM ABOUT RELATIONS
In both of the commentaries I mentioned earlier-the Categories commentary and the commentary on the Metaphysics-Albert makes it clear that he accepts a form of realism about relations. What seems to be driving his realism, moreover, is a particular conception of the Aristotelian categories. According to Albert, the ten categories do not classify mere concepts or beings of reason (entia rationis); they classify things existing in extramental reality (res). Since relation is one of these categories, he thinks that there must be some extramental beings that comprise it-beings which in turn correspond to our relational concepts.
Albert begins his discussions of relations in both commentaries by taking up several anti-realist objections. In his commentary on the Categories, he considers six objections, most of which purport to show that relations are mere beings of reason-that is, that there are relational concepts but nothing in extramental reality corresponding to them. Although Albert claims that "the ancients, and nearly all philosophers besides
Plato and Aristotle, have been moved to [reject realism] on the basis of these and other such arguments", his own commitment to realism is unwavering. "We agree" says Albert "with Plato and Aristotle: we maintain that toward something is a most general genus, and one of the most general genera of accident."
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When we turn to the commentary on the Metaphysics, we also find Albert addressing several anti-realist objections. In this work, however, he construes the conclusion of the objections more broadly, so that what they purport to show is merely 7 that relations do not exist in extramental reality (without explicitly drawing the conclusion that relations therefore exist only in the mind). Once again, however, Albert's own position is clear. "In response to this"-that is, in response to the sort of antirealism just advanced-"we say that in fact (and in accordance with the wisdom of the Peripatetics) relation has being." 13 It is clear from the context, moreover, that he means "relation has extramental being".
It is tempting for us, in the early twenty-first century, to suppose that realism about relations implies the existence of polyadic properties. Albert does not himself, however, think that realism has this implication. According to him, relations comprise one of the accidental categories of being. And like so many Aristotelians over the centuries, Albert conceives of accidents in such a way that their particular instances-the so-called particular accidents-can belong to only one subject at a time. 14 But if relations are accidents, and accidents are properties whose instances can belong to only one subject at a time, then relations would appear to comprise a category of monadic, as opposed to polyadic, properties.
None of this goes to show, however, that Albert lacked the concept of a polyadic property, or even that he failed to consider the possibility of its instantiation. In fact, near the end of his discussion of relations in the Categories commentary, Albert appears to consider and then explicitly to reject the existence of polyadic properties. In this passage, he is considering whether converse relations, such as fatherhood and sonship, are numerically distinct entities or just one entity standing between two (or more) related substances. 15 In support of the latter view, Albert imagines someone offering the following analogy:
8 It seems that sonship and fatherhood differ only as regards their termini, just as the road which runs from Thebes to Athens is the same as the road which runs from Athens to Thebes, although there is a difference in termini. 16 Albert's response to this analogy is telling. Although he admits that a relation is similar to a road in a certain respect, he denies that there is anything in extramental reality extending between the relata of a relation:
As for what was objected about its being the same road which runs from Thebes however, that in the actual statement of the objection Albert speaks, not of "relation" or "toward something", but of "comparison" (comparatio) and "the form which is the basis of the comparison" (comparationis forma). This is way of speaking is characteristic of Albert's treatment of anti-realism in the Categories commentary, which habitually employs the term "comparison" as a near synonym for "relation". 23 This choice of terminology might seem to beg the question in favor of conceptualism, or at least to make the conclusion of the objectors' argument trivial (namely, that comparisons exist only in the mind). But this is just an appearance. As we shall see, Albert is perfectly willing to speak of comparisons themselves existing outside the mind. 24 If we turn now to the structure of the sixth objection, we can see that it begins with an appeal to ordinary sensory experience. On the basis of this intuitive appeal to experience, the objectors think that they are entitled to draw the following conclusion (see lines 2-3 of their objection quoted
No form that is a being belongs to a thing unless it is absolute as far as the being that it has in itself is concerned.
Here the objectors attempt to identify what they think is the only type of form that can be included among the objective properties of individuals. As the objection proceeds, it becomes clearer that they are using the term "being" (ens) and its cognates to contrast things existing in extramental reality (res) with things that exist only in the mind, namely, concepts (rationes). Thus, when they speak here of "forms that are beings", this should be interpreted to mean forms that exist outside the mind. Moreover, when they say that such forms belong to a thing only if their being is "absolute", this implies that all such forms are monadic or characterize their subjects intrinsically. What the objectors intend their appeal to experience to show, therefore, is that only monadic forms can be included among the objective properties of individuals. And of course this is just another way of saying that there are no polyadic forms or properties in extramental reality.
Having rejected the existence of real polyadic forms or properties, the objectors are now in a position to deny the existence of relations in extramental reality. Before drawing this conclusion, however, they make explicit an assumption that is perhaps already intuitive (see lines 8-11):
The form […] which is the basis of the comparison is not a reality but a concept-or so it seems, since there is nothing outside the soul of the person who compares the one thing to the other.
The point, of course, is that if there are no polyadic forms or properties outside the mind, there is nothing in extramental reality corresponding to our relational concepts.
Bringing all of these points together, we may reconstruct the sixth objection as follows:
(1) There are no polyadic forms or properties in extramental reality. The important question, of course, is what it means to say that relations exist outside the mind merely in accordance with aptitude. On the sort of picture that Albert has in mind (roughly that given by Aristotle in the Physics), an aptitude is a power or a potentiality for a specific type of activity. In the case of relations, the relevant power is the power for being compared or related in the mind of some cognizer. Thus, when
Albert says that relations exist in things merely in aptitude, this just appears to mean that there exist some properties of things in virtue of which they are apt to be compared.
Thus, to return to my earlier example, coffee is similar to cream in some respect because it has properties which enable us to form a (true) judgment or comparison in which the concept of similarity is applied to the coffee and cream.
In order to bring out the significance of Albert's reply, it may be useful to consider an analogy that has come to be used in a variety of contemporary contexts, namely, the analogy to so-called secondary qualities (colors, tastes, sounds, warmth and coldness, etc.). Since the seventeenth century, philosophers and scientists have been developing a conception of the world that might seem to allow no place among the objective properties of bodies for qualities such as colors, tastes, and sounds. The objective properties of bodies, we are told, include only such qualities as extension, shape, and motion. This is not, of course, to deny that we have ideas of colors, tastes, and sounds, but only to deny that anything in the external environment is at all like them.
Now it is easy to imagine how someone, on first being presented with this scientific world-view, might draw the conclusion that colors, tastes, and sounds exist only in the mind-meaning by this that words like "red", "juicy", and "sweet" apply, not to bodies such as apples or strawberries, but only to our sensations, ideas, or experiences of them. But as philosophers since the time of John Locke have been reminding us, inferences of this sort are fallacious. Even if nothing in the external environment resembles our ideas of redness or sweetness, it doesn't follow that the ideas themselves have no genuine application to things in that environment. After all, such ideas may apply to things solely in virtue of qualities such as extension, and shape, and motion.
In order to guard against fallacious inferences of the sort just mentioned, Locke explicitly distinguishes two different types of quality. All qualities, he suggests, are powers to produce ideas or sensations in us. Some qualities, however, are in some sense similar (or isomorphic) to the ideas or sensations that they produce, whereas others are not. The former he calls primary or original qualities, since "their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves", whereas the latter (or a species of the latter) 28 he calls secondary qualities, since they no more resemble something existing in a body than "the names that stand for them are the likenesses of our ideas". Again, to emphasize their distinction, Locke describes the so-called secondary qualities as "nothing in objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities".
(A) There isn't anything in extramental reality isomorphic to our relational concepts.
(B) There isn't anything in extramental reality grounding the applicability of our relational concepts.
Once this ambiguity is made explicit, however, we can see that the argument rests on an equivocation. If we interpret it along the lines of (A), the second premise is true, but the third is false-or at least there is no reason to accept it. Just because there's nothing isomorphic to our relational concepts, it doesn't follow that there's nothing grounding their applicability. If, on the other hand, we interpret the argument along the lines of (B), the third premise is true, but the second is false or unmotivated. Just because there are no extramental polyadic properties, it doesn't follow that there's nothing grounding the applicability of our relational concepts. What this shows, of course, is that there is no uniform interpretation of the premises that yields a sound argument.
In addition to locating a fallacy in his objectors' reasoning, Albert's reply to the sixth objection also helps to clarify his own theory of relations. Like his objectors, Albert accepts that relational concepts are polyadic and that there is nothing in extramental reality isomorphic to these concepts. But unlike them, he does not infer that relations exist only in the mind. For, as he recognizes, even if there are no real polyadic forms or properties, relations can still exist outside the mind as powers or aptitudes. Of course, these powers or aptitudes will have to be monadic, but that's part of his reason for calling them mere powers or aptitudes. On Albert's view, therefore, there is something in extramental reality grounding the applicability of our relational concepts, it's just not polyadic in nature. Or to put the point in a slightly different way, there is something in extramental reality that corresponds to our concepts of relations, but only in the weak sense of "correspondence". Hereafter I shall refer to this sort of view as realism without polyadic properties.
On the basis of the analogy I drew to certain discussions in early modern Consider the following three propositions:
(a) There are no real polyadic properties.
(b) Relational judgments are irreducible, and (c) Relational concepts have an objective ground in reality.
As we have seen, Albert's objectors think that these propositions form an inconsistent triad. Because they are convinced of (a) on the basis of empirical considerations, and because they accept the truth of (b), they reject (c) in favor of some form of conceptualism. Like the objectors, Russell, Weinberg, and Grossmann appear to think that (a)-(c) form an inconsistent triad. Unlike the objectors, however, they are convinced of (b) and (c), and hence reject (a) in favor of polyadic properties.
What Albert rightly points out, however, is that these claims are not inconsistent.
Of course, if we make the further assumption that In addition to helping us identify the fallacy involved in the standard logical objection to reductionism about relations, Albert also helps us to see why it is so often committed. The inference from claims about the irreducibility of relational propositions to the existence of polyadic properties ultimately depends on the assumption stated at (d).
And even if this assumption is false, it has a strong intuitive appeal. After all, a natural way to think of the relationship between concepts and their objects, propositions and the facts that make them true, is on the analogy of pictures and the scenes they depict. Just as pictures resemble what they are pictures of, and their parts correspond to the parts of the scenes they depict, so too, we are inclined to think, propositions and concepts relate to facts and their constituents.
REDUCTIVE VS. NON-REDUCTIVE REALISM
We have now identified the general type of realism to which Albert is committed.
There is, however, a further issue that still needs to be resolved. What, according to Albert, is the precise nature and ontological status of the properties which ground the applicability of our relational concepts?
The most obvious thing to be said about these properties is that they must be monadic. For as we have seen, they are not isomorphic to our relational concepts precisely because they are not polyadic in nature. Now on the simplest, or most Socrates will be nothing other than a pair of heights-in this case, say, Simmias's being six-feet-tall and Socrates's being five-feet-ten-inches-tall. Alternatively, the reductive realist might identify this relation with just Simmias's height in certain circumstances, including the circumstance that Socrates is five-feet-ten. 36 Albert's talk of relations as powers or aptitudes would seem to fit well with the second of these two alternative forms of reductive realism. For when Albert says that a relation is a mere power or aptitude he just means that a relation is that form or property in virtue of which one thing is comparable to another. As we have just seen, however, Simmias's height is plausibly regarded as that in virtue of which he is comparable to
Socrates in the relevant respect. Again, if we reflect on the analogy to secondary qualities, which is suggested by Albert's talk of relations as powers, this might also lead 22 us to suppose that Albert accepts a form of reductive realism. Just as secondary qualities are often thought to be nothing ontologically over and above the more scientifically acceptable primary qualities, so too, we might suppose, Albert regards relational powers as nothing over and above ordinary monadic properties of individuals.
As it turns out, however, Albert explicitly rejects any form of reductive realism.
According to him, the category of relation is not just a category of being, but a distinct or irreducible category of being. Albert's commitment to this conception of relations emerges most clearly in his commentary on the Metaphysics, where he begins his discussion of the category by saying:
It is difficult for us to speak about [the category of] toward something or relation, because it has a nature and being altogether different from the genera of being which have been considered so far [namely, substance, quantity, and quality]. 37 Again, a little further on he says:
[Relation] has a mode of being different from the other genera that have been introduced so far. This is because the other genera express being which is absolute, and so their essences are composed from their own principles, quite apart from the principles of the subjects in which they inhere (consider, for example, quality and quantity). But this genus does not have that sort of entitative standing (habet entitatem aliquam talem). On the contrary, the subject's outward-looking-ness (respectus) itself gives entitative standing to this genus. 38 In this second passage, Albert not only distinguishes the category of relations from the other accidental categories, but provides his grounds for doing so. Relations, he says, have a distinct sort of nature or essence. Unlike the members of the absolute categories, which characterize their subjects only intrinsically, relations have a nature that is 23 outward-looking. Indeed, in the second of the two passages, Albert just identifies relations with this outward-looking-ness (respectus). 39 It is worth noting that in the Metaphysics commentary, where Albert is especially concerned to establish the irreducibility of this category, he begins to speak of relations as existing in actuality, whereas as in the Categories commentary he had spoken of them exclusively as mere powers or potentialities. 40 This difference in speech, however, seems to me to result, not from any change in doctrine, but merely from a change in emphasis.
In by saying that, although Albert agrees with Abelard that relations supervene on the exemplification of certain ordinary monadic properties, he disagrees with him on the question whether relations are anything additional to that on which they supervene.
RELATION AS SENSE (OR DIRECTION)
We now come to the most difficult issue to resolve in Albert's theory of relations. As we have seen, Albert is committed to the existence of a sui generis type of monadic property, the members of which ground the applicability of our relational In these passages, Albert arranges the standard medieval terms for relation in decreasing order of appropriateness. In each case, moreover, his reason for preferring "toward something" seems to be that this term best expresses the nature of relations. As Albert says in the passage from his Categories commentary: "toward something" conveys the two things that are involved in the nature of relation, namely, diversity and direction. By "diversity" Albert appears to mean diversity of relata or things related. Relations always involve two (or more) things, whether the diversity between these things is real (as in the case of Simmias and Socrates), or merely conceptual (as in the case of Socrates and the teacher of Plato). When Albert speaks of "direction", moreover, he appears to be indicating that relations proceed, as it were, from one thing toward another. Albert sometimes puts these two points together by saying that relations have subjects of inherence whose relations they are and termini with respect to which they relate their subjects. 43 If the nature of relations is best expressed by the prepositional phrase "toward
something", what about the other terms, "relative" and "relation"? At first glance, neither would seem to express the procession of relations from a subject to a terminus. The term "relative", however, masks an underlying complexity. In Latin, as in English, a thing cannot be merely relative; it must be relative to something. Hence, even if this term does not indicate the procession of relations on its surface, it does so at the level of deep logical structure. As for the term "relation", however, it would not appear to express this procession at all. According to Albert, what is expressed by this term is something midway between two things. 44 This way of talking, however, is derived from the spatial metaphor of a road's being between two cities, which seems to lose the directionality of relation altogether. It is not surprising, therefore, that Albert says that this last term expresses the nature of relation least appropriately of all. Indeed, when he is being most careful, he uses "relation" exclusively to signify relational concepts. 45 In these terminological remarks, Albert seems to me to be getting at what
Bertrand Russell once called the "sense" of a relation. It is significant, I think, that when
Russell speaks of this notion in the Principles of Mathematics, he comes very close to using Albert's terminology:
[I]t is characteristic of a relation of two terms that it proceeds, so to speak, from one to another. This is what may be called the sense of the relation, and is, as we shall find, the source of order and series. 46 Again, a little further on he says:
We may distinguish the term from which the relation proceeds as the referent, and the term to which it proceeds as the relatum. The sense of a relation is a fundamental notion, which is not capable of definition. 47 Russell discusses the notion of a sense at various places in his work, but the clearest accounts of it emerge in his discussions of the cognitive relation of judging. Consider, for example, the following passage from The Problems of Philosophy, where Russell also speaks of it as a "direction":
It will be observed that the relation of judging has what is called a 'sense' or 'direction'. We may say, metaphorically, that it puts its objects in a certain order, It is clear from these passages that Russell thinks of all relations, not just the cognitive relation of judging, as possessing a 'sense' or 'direction'. It is clear, moreover, that he thinks this sense or direction is an irreducible feature of relations, one which must be invoked to explain the structure and order we find in the world. Albert appears to be making a similar point when he says that relations are "toward something" or "relative" as opposed to merely standing 'between' things. But whereas Russell says that every relation has (or possesses) a sense, I suggest that we think of Albert as saying every relation is (or is identical to) a sense. 49 If something like this is right-and I don't want to push the analogy with Russell too far-then I think we can understand why Albert might be drawn to a form of what I am calling non-reductionism about relations. For if we think of relations solely in terms of ordinary monadic properties, as the reductive realists do, then we seem to lose the order or directionality in question. As Albert would put it, this directionality is an 29 outward-looking feature of individuals, whereas ordinary monadic properties are wholly inward-looking.
To some extent, therefore, we can think of Albert as siding with Russell against the reductive realists, philosophers such as Abelard who want to reduce relations to nothing but ordinary monadic properties. Of course, we have to be careful here. Albert also rejects the existence of polyadic properties. Unlike Russell, therefore, he cannot think of directionality as a feature of polyadic properties. For him this directionality must be a feature of related individuals-or perhaps even better, a feature of ordinary monadic properties.
What Albert's theory appears to be calling our attention to, therefore, is a sort of middle road between reductive realism and the sort of realism defended by Russell. In order to make this clearer, let us return once more to our example involving Simmias and
Socrates. According to the reductive realist, Simmias's being taller than Socrates is nothing but Simmias, Socrates, and the pair of heights instantiated by them. According to Russell, by contrast, there is in addition to these elements a polyadic property, beingtaller-than, which possesses a certain direction (in this case running from Simmias to Socrates). Now, like the reductive realist, Albert rejects the existence of polyadic properties such as being-taller-than. Like Russell, on the other hand, he does not want to dispense with the feature of directionality. Evidently, therefore, we can think of Albert's view as something like Russell's view sans polyadic properties. Whereas Russell makes directionality a feature of relations, which just are for him polyadic properties, Albert identifies this directionality with relations (or cases of what he prefers to call toward something or out-ward-lookingness), and makes it a feature of ordinary monadic properties-or in this case, a feature of heights.
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The plausibility of this sort of theory will, of course, be challenged by proponents of both of the views that it purports to steer a middle course between.
Reductionists such as Abelard, for example, will want to say that the ordinary monadic properties of individuals are all that's required to explain the relatedness in question, and hence that Albert's appeal to a special type of monadic property is gratuitous.
(Moreover, in the case of quantitative relations, such as being-taller-than, Abelard's claim has a certain amount of plausibility. If this relation really supervenes on a pair of heights-that is, if it is really necessitated by them-then perhaps the heights themselves are sufficient to ground the applicability of the relational concept, 'is taller than.') On the other hand, however, non-reductionists such as Russell will criticize Albert's theory for misidentifying the nature of relations. If relations are really irreducible, they will say, then relations must be irreducibly polyadic.
It is not my purpose here to provide anything like a complete defense of Albert's theory. But I would like to indicate, at least, that Albert has the resources to respond to these objections. I begin with a few general remarks about the reductionist position.
According to a reductionist such as Abelard, Simmias's being taller than Socrates is nothing over and above a pair of ordinary monadic properties, say, Simmias's and
Socrates's heights taken together-or perhaps just Simmias's height taken in certain circumstances. 50 Now as we have seen, this type of reductive theory is often rejected on the basis of purely logical or semantic considerations: the fact that statements of the form "x is tall" are more perspicuously represented as of the form "x is taller than y" is often thought to imply that "tallness" does not refer to a genuine monadic property (or even a pair of monadic properties) but is an elliptical way of referring to a polyadic property, being-taller-than. As we have seen, however, this type of objection rests on an unwarranted assumption. There is no reason, at least in principle, why an irreducibly polyadic predicate or concept cannot signify a monadic property (or pair of monadic properties).
But perhaps there is a way of reformulating this type of objection that is favorable to Albert's theory. For there is still a question as to why, if a view such as Abelard's is true, we would represent situations containing only monadic constituents as if they contained irreducibly polyadic ones. If Simmias's being taller than Socrates really is nothing ontologically over and above Simmias, Socrates, and their respective heights, then why, Albert might ask, do we represent the relation as if it were something over and above these things? At this point, Abelard can only appeal to our psychological makeup. We simply do represent (or at least are capable of representing) one and the same situation (say, Simmias's being six-feet-tall while Socrates is five-feet-ten) in these two very different ways.
Now even if one does not find such an appeal to psychology implausible, Albert's theory would seem to offer a better answer to the original question, namely, "Why do we represent Simmias's being taller than Socrates as distinct from Simmias's being six-feet-tall while Socrates is five-feet-ten?" According to Albert, the reason we represent these two situations (or states of affairs) as distinct is that they are distinct.
Indeed, Albert might say, the logical incompleteness of predicates such as "is tall" or "is taller" calls our attention to precisely what makes these situations distinct-namely, the directionality involved in the one, but not the other situation.
Once this strategy for responding to reductionism has been identified, however, it
is of course open to someone like Russell to deploy it against Albert's own theory.
Indeed, we can imagine a Russellian asking: "Isn't it the presence of a genuinely polyadic
property that best explains why we represent Simmias's being taller than Socrates as a situation of the form xRy?" The answer to this question, however, is not altogether clear.
For one thing, the mere presence of a polyadic property is not sufficient to explain our representation of the situation. This is especially evident because being-taller-than is an asymmetrical relation; that is to say, if a statement of the form "x is taller than y" is true, then a statement of the form "y is taller than x" is false. What is required to explain our representation of this situation, therefore, is not merely the presence of a polyadic property but a polyadic property together with a certain sense or direction. But once we invoke the notion of a sense or direction, it is no longer clear that we need the polyadic property. For the mere presence of a sense or direction would seem to explain both (a)
why we represent the situation as Simmias's being taller than Socrates, as opposed to the other way round, and (b) why we represent it more generally as of the form xRy. After all, how else could we represent the fact that Simmias is directed toward Socrates?
Now, of course, Russell could try to insist that the sense or direction in question just is a polyadic property. Here again, however, it is not clear why his objection should have any force. For one thing, it is not clear that Russell can consistently maintain this position. According to him, all relations or polyadic properties have a sense. But if senses are themselves polyadic, then a potentially vicious infinite regress threatens: the sense of a relation will itself require a sense, and so on to infinity.
More to the point, however, it is not clear how anyone, much less Russell, could defend the claim that a sense or direction must be polyadic. Certainly there are situations that involve this directionality, and hence we can agree that it is a feature of the world that demands an explanation. But whether this feature must be construed as polyadic would appear to be as open to debate as the question, in the philosophy of mind, of whether intentionality is a many-place relation or a sui generis type of monadic property.
In the end, therefore, Albert's non-reductive realism would seem to provide a genuine alternative to the views standardly presented in the contemporary discussion of relations. Moreover, this alternative is not a mere logical possibility, but a position which ought to appeal to anyone who feels the weight of the purely logical or semantic considerations, but who also prefers the economy of an Aristotelian view of the world. respectively. It is difficult to identify anyone who has actually held the view that I am calling Pure Nominalism, but perhaps Willfrid Sellars is an example from the last century. 52 As for Pure Conceptualism, we have seen that Albert thinks it is traceable to Avicenna and Alfarabi, although at least in the case of Avicenna it seems clear to me that he does not endorse the view. 53 There are, however, other Islamic thinkers who appear to have endorsed a form of Pure Conceptualism, including the members of a group of orthodox Muslim theologians known as the Mutakallimūn. 54 Again, Peter Aureoli (d.
1322
) is a representative of Pure Conceptualism in the Latin West. 55 As for the view we might call "Impure Anti-Realism", the view that relations are both words and concepts, I
have not been able to identify any genuine representatives. William Ockham certainly speaks in ways that are suggestive of this form of anti-realism, but in the end it cannot be said to represent his own position. 56 As in the case of Anti-Realism, we can distinguish several species of Realism.
The most important division among realists-namely, those who think of relations as (non-linguistic) extramental beings-is the division between those who identify relations with polyadic properties and those who do not. The first species of Realism would include many (if not most) contemporary, analytic philosophers, whereas the second would include almost everyone writing prior to the twentieth century. As we have seen, moreover, there is an important division among realists without polyadic properties.
Some, such as Peter Abelard, attempt to reduce relations to ordinary monadic properties, whereas others, such as Albert the Great, deny that such a reduction can be achieved (and hence identify relations as a sui generis type of monadic property).
35
Now, on the basis of this taxonomy, we can begin to understand why particular philosophers working within the Aristotelian tradition have preferred one sort of theory over another. As we have seen in the case of Albert, the position these philosophers take on the long-standing controversy surrounding the Aristotelian categories (namely, whether these categories classify words, concepts, or things) in large part determines their preference for realism about relations, or some form of anti-realism (such as nominalism or conceptualism). Again, the extent to which they are influenced by Aristotle's conception of relation as a specific type of accident is important for determining their attitude towards polyadic properties. During the ancient and early medieval periods, philosophers habitually rejected the existence of real polyadic properties. In the later medieval and early modern periods, however, as philosophers felt freer to resist
Aristotle's conception of accident, they began gravitating toward a view more hospitable to such properties. 57 Finally, among those Aristotelians who reject the extramental existence of polyadic properties, the division between reductionists and non-reductionists in large part hinges on the question whether the categories in general, or the category of relation in particular, should be conceived of as irreducible.
As we have seen, Albert himself occupies an interesting place on this taxonomy, 3 In the contexts on which I shall be focusing, Albert speaks as if every relational predicate introduces a special type of monadic property, one which exists in extramental reality. As we shall see, however, all that he is strictly committed to saying here is that at least some relational predicates introduce such properties. In other contexts, therefore, he is free to maintain that, while some relational predicates introduce sui generis monadic properties, yet others introduce ordinary I should indicate at the outset that, although a decade or more separates the writing of Albert's Categories and Metaphysics commentaries, these two works do not seem to me to contain any substantive doctrinal differences with respect to the points I consider. For a discussion of the dating of Albert's works, see the references cited in note 2.
5 Categories 1a25. 6 Boethius sets the precedent here. In his commentary on the Categories, which introduced medieval philosophers to all three terms, he not only alternates among them but explicitly denies that there is any difference in meaning between two of them, namely, "toward something" and 7 Medieval philosophers use the same terms to refer to predicates and the entities signified by them. 8 The medieval distinction between absolute and relative terms corresponds, therefore, to the contemporary distinction between monadic and polyadic predicates. It must not be inferred from this, however, that what medieval philosophers call "absolute" and "relative forms" corresponds to what we call "monadic" and "polyadic properties" (respectively). An absolute form is just an entity that is signified by an absolute term, and a relative form (or relation) is an entity signified by a relative term. Since one and the same entity can, however, be signified by both types of terms, it is possible for one and the same thing to be both absolute and relative (though, of course, nothing could be both monadic and polyadic). 11 Although this characterization of realism and conceptualism is the one suggested by Albert's discussion, and is acceptable for our purposes here, in other contexts it would have to be refined. Realism is the view that there is something in extramental reality immediately corresponding to at least some of our relational concepts.
Moderate Conceptualism is the view that there is something in extramental reality corresponding to our relational concepts, but only mediately.
Radical Conceptualism is the view that there is nothing in extramental reality corresponding to our relational concepts, either mediately or immediately.
As we shall see, the only form of conceptualism that Albert is concerned with is a form of moderate conceptualism, according to which relational concepts are at least indirectly or mediately grounded in the objective properties of things.
